Rear Admiral V. L. Lowrance Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Admiral Lowrance:

I have studied your memorandum, OP-922, Serial No. 00704P92, dated 21 June 1962, and welcome your wish that our joint efforts in assessing foreign submarine developments be made mutually as helpful and effective as possible. of our Office of Central Reference has contacted Captain R. L. Taylor, USN, as you suggested, and has worked out with him procedures for contacts between our two organizations which I am sure will be satisfactory to all concerned.

Faithfully yours.

NAVY review(s) completed.

Marshall S. Carter Lieutenant General, USA Deputy Director

cc: Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, USAF Director, DIA

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	☑XIX Final version concurred in by AD/DCI Distribution:
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY


OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

OP-922

Ser 007704P92

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MEMORANDUM FOR Lieutenant General Marshall S. CARTER, U. S. Army (Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency)

Subj: Coordination of Naval Intelligence Efforts on Foreign Submarines (C)

Ref:

- (a) CIA SECRET msg 121755Z to USN SubBase New London
- (b) NSCID #3 (Revised 18 Jan 1961)
- (c) DCID #3/5 (Dated 3 Feb 1959)
- (d) Op-921 ser 27284P92 of 11 Aug 1960; subj: CIA Requests for Plant Clearances
- 1. Reference (a) indicates an extensive effort by the Central Intelligence Agency in a field of intelligence exploitation for which the Navy has a unique competence.
- 2. References (b) and (c), particularly paragraph 7b. of the former and paragraph 1c. of the latter, have been a basis for the assumption by the Office of Naval Intelligence of primary responsibility for the assessment and evaluation of the design, construction and performance of Soviet submarines.
- 3. We have an extensive effort and considerable competence in the field of foreign submarine developments. Nevertheless, that effort is not now, and probably never can be, so extensive and competent that it can do without assistance from other interested agencies in the intelligence community both at home and abroad. It is also recognized that no complete separation of areas of interest is desirable or possible in this day and age. However, it is felt that the closest possible coordination of effort by all interested parties is necessary to avoid undesirable and unnecessary duplication of effort or unjustified conflicts in assessments of important foreign submarine developments. In this connection it should be noted that reference (d) did not include visits to U. S. Naval facilities.
- 4. Therefore, I urge that we both examine the nature and extent of our efforts in this area, the degree of coordination and liaison that exists, and what might be done to insure that our efforts are mutually helpful and effective. The point of contact in my office for general supervision and coordination of our foreign intelligence efforts is Captain R. L. TAYLOR, USN, who heads up my Foreign Intelligence Division. He is located in room 5C564 in the Pentagon and can be reached on extensions

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suggest that you have your people contact him on this or any other matter involving the coordination of foreign intelligence exploitation of mutual interest. He will then arrange for the necessary working level coordination that is the essence of successful collaboration in these efforts.

V. L. LOWRANCE

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy Director of Naval Intelligence

Copy to: LTGEN Joseph F. CARROLL, USAF (Director, DIA)



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	18 July 1962
Personal Personal	MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral V. L. Lowrance, USN Director of Naval Intelligence
person	SUBJECT : Coordination of Intelligence Efforts on Foreign Submarines
	REFERENCE : ONI Memo, OP-922, Serial No. 00704P92, 21 June 1962,
25X1	1. I have studied your memorandum referred to above and welcome your wish that our joint efforts in assessing foreign submarine developments be made mutually as helpful and effective as possible. To be the product of the product of the possible of the product
	believe that we have any jurisdictional problem here. As yet know, the coordination of all national intelligence assets bearing on strategic threats to the United States is one of the fundamental missions of the Central Intelligence Agency. We have long recognized the high professional competence which your organization has developed in the field of foreign submarine capabilities, and we, too, are that to bring about the closest possible coordination of our efforts.
	3. We are, therefore, glad to accept Captain Taylor's suggestion that arrangements be made for closer working level exchanges, particularly on matters concerning the Soviet submarine situation.
	MARSHALL S. CARTER Lt. General, US Army Deputy Director

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18 July 1962

Meeting with Captain Taylor, OP-922, 17 July 1962

Taylor notes that the Frankel memorandum of 11 August 1960 specifically applies only to industrial facilites under the Navy-these ONI does want to get involved in. But New London is a Navy submarine base under EINCLANT and ultimately under CNO. What happened here was that New London asked OPNAV for an OK on the CIA visit (the CIA cable went directly to New London) and CNO knew nothing about it. Moreover, the cable stated that the analysts to visit New London were responsible for the assessment and evaluation of the design, construction, and performance of Soviet submarines. CNO and DNI had labored under the impression the DCID's and NSCID's had given them the responsibility for this field. Therefore, CNO became concerned over duplication of efforts and over contacts with operating elements of the Navy without the blessing of CNO. To avoid this, Captain Taylor proposes that visits to industrial facilities under the Navy be allowed as they are now; i.e., without reference to ONI, but that all CIA contacts with Naval units and facilities under the cognizance of CNO be referred through ONI. Captain Taylor wished to be the initial contact in all new cases, and will step out as soon as the desired further contact has been made.

captain raylor ruriner noted his concern at possible duplication,					
wondered how big an effort we had on Soviet submarines, noted the					
existence of an effective and quite complete channel involving					
OCI, and at NSA,					
and particularly the dispulsar of close working level contacts between					
our people and technical types at STIC (Scientific and Technical					
Intelligence Center) at the observatory. He is very interested in					
the freest possible cross-telling at the working level on the sub-					
marine problem, suggests that we get in contact with Captain George					
Grkovic, the head of STIC, and Lcdr. Prisley in OP-922. He also					
noted how helpful Admiral Rickover's office had been to ONI on the					
submarine problem.					
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Contain Maril on further noted his concern at maggible duplication

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NOTE TO GENERAL CARTER:

Have seen Captain Taylor and have solved laison problem in a fashion satisfactory to both OSI and ONI. This will be enshrined in a CIA Laison notice shortly. Attached is a draft memorandum from you to Admiral Lowrance (Taylor said Navy did not expect a reply), and the notes on my session with Captain Taylor.

J. J. (under new cap as OCR)

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
MEMORANDUM FOR: Pin: Curter	
Letter from ONI Direct Fourance in late June, offering coordination of liason assets	tor G.
intel on foreign subs.	
Refs were finally traced 051 in DD/1.	
repand says he has it was	pped
up. I still suggested he give a reply to Lowrance (DATE)	
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.	(47)

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Action has been transferred to OSI on this for preparation of reply for DDCI signature. Attached are references which help make sense out of the memo. Apparently, ONI is upset because of the fact that CIA contacted the Navy installation direct which is not covered by ref. d., as that refere only to industrial facilities. Perhaps, though, they are also asking for a more comprehensive and thorough review of existing coordination and liaison. (IN other words, instead of just a "sorry this happened" memo)

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